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ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to investigate the factors determining the impact of exchange
rate regimes on the behavior of domestic investment and foreign direct investment (FDO, and
the correlation between exchange rate volatility and investment. We assume that producers
may diversify internationally in order to increase the flexibility of production: being a
multinational enables producers to reallocate employment and production towards the more
efficient or the cheaper plant. We characterize the possible equilibria in a macro model that
allows for the presence of a short-run Phillips curve, under a fixed and a flexible exchange
rate regime. It is shown that a fixed exchange rate regime is more conducive to FIN relative
to a flexible exchange rate, and this conclusion applies for both real and nominal shocks. The
correlation between investment and exchange rate volatility under a flexible exchange rate is
shown to depend on the nature of the shocks. If the dominant shocks are nominal, we will
observe a negative correlation, whereas if the dominant shocks arc real, we will observe a






The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of exchange rate flexibility on
the patterns of domestic and foreign direct investment (FL)!). The importance of this topic
sterns from several observations. The recent two decades have been characterized by the
growing integration of capital markets, and the substantial increase in the importance of FDI
flows. Figure 1 traces the evolution of the ratio of FDI flows relative to merchandise tra(le
for industrialized and the developing countries. IIt reveals that from the mid seventies until
1981- 1982 the trend towards higher relative importance of FDI flows was common to both
groups of nations. Following the debt crisis we observed a decline in that ratio for developing
countries in the late eighties, while the upward trend continued for the industrialized nations.
The recent experience of Mexico and Chile suggests that a resolution of the debt crisis will
revitalize the upward trend in the relative importance of FDI for the developing countries.
Throughout that period, we observed various types of exchange rate regimes. On balance, the
European countries adopted policies whose goal was to minimize the fluctuations of their
bilateral exchange rates. The United States, Japan, and Canada adhered to a flexible exchange
rate system, which implies that each of them adapted a flexible exchange rate with regard to
the European block. Most developing countries adopted a fixed exchange rate or a crawling
peg.
These observations suggest that further attention should be given to the degree to which
the nature of exchange rate regimens influences the evolution of domestic investment and FDI.
Should countries that wish to encourage FDI increase the flexibility of their exchange rates, or
is a fixed exchange rate regime more conducive to FDI. While existing studies have
investigated the impact of exchange rate volatility on investment and international trade, not
enough attention was given to the more fundamental forces that determine the evolution of
prices, exchange rates, and the volume of trade.2 Since investment, exchange rates, and the
The data for Figure 1 was taken from the IMF Balance of Payment Statistics.
2For a discussion regarding the factors affecting FDI in recent years and the85 87 89 Year
in Mexico and Chile, 1974-1989
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volume of international trade are endogenous variables that adjust to various shocks, their
behavior can be better understood if the underlying forces affecting each economy are traced.
A macroeconomic modeling strategy, where the exchange rate, prices, employment, and
investment are endogenously determined may provide a more coherent interpretation to the
observable correlations. The usefulness of this procedure stems from the possibility that the
correlations among investment, volatility, and exchange rates differ among economies, due to
differences in structure. A purpose of this paper is to provide such a model. We apply it to
identify the dependency of the correlations among observable variables on the composition of
shocks, and to investigate the impact of exchange rate regimes on the behavior of investment.
To isolate the role of exchange rate regimes, we concentrate on the case where there is
no impedance to international trade in goods or to FDI, and where agents are risk neutral.
Thus, we ignore the potential role of commercial policy and transportation costs as reasons for
FDI, and the possibility that the degree of risk aversion plays a role in determining the pattern
of investment. We assume that labor is immobile, and installed capital is location- and sector-
specific. There is a one-period lag between the implementation of investment in productive
capital and the availability of the productive capacity. The economy is subject to productivity
and monetary shocks, and the supply side is characterized by the presence of a short-run
Phillips curve. FDI is motivated by the producer's attempt to increase the flexibility of
production: being a multinational enables producers to reallocate employment and production
towards the more efficient or the cheaper plant. This flexibility gives the producer the option
to adjust its international production pattern to the realization of shocks, at the cost of carrying
the extra productive capacity.3 To address the implications of the exchange rate regime on the
implications of exchange rate volatility on investment see, for example, Froot and Stein
(1989), Edwards (1990), Klein and Rosengren (1990) and Goldberg (1990).
3 A version of this model was used in Aizenman (1991) to evaluate the implications
of restrictions on capital mobility on the welfare ranking of exchange rate regimes.-3-
pattern of direct investment, we construct an economy characterized by monopolistic
competition, where production at a given period requires investment in the productive capacity
a period ago.4 The investment is implemented by risk-free entrepreneurs, who face the option
to operate as multinational or as nondiversified, national producers. We assume free entry.
and hence the equilibrium is characterized by the requirement that the expected economic rent
is dissipated.5
The key outcome of our analysis is that a fixed exchange rate regime is more conducive
to domestic investment and FDI relative to a flexible exchange rate; this conclusion applies for
both real and nominal shocks. It is shown that, for a given characterization of shocks, the
resultant investment and FDI is higher in a fixed exchange rate regime. For the case of
monetary shocks, the concavity of the production function implies that volatile nominal shocks
will reduce expected profits under a flexible exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange rates are
capable of better isolating real wages and production from monetary shocks, and thus they are
associated with lower volatility and thereby with higher expected profits. The higher expected
income is, in turn, supporting higher domestic investment and FDI. For real shocks, flexible
exchange rates are associated with lower volatility of employment and with lower expected
profits. This conclusion stems from the observation that a country experiencing a positive
productivity shock will tend to experience nominal and real appreciation, which will mitigate
(and may even eliminate) the resultant employment expansion. In a fixed exchange rate system
the nominal appreciation mechanism does not work, hence employment will tend to expand in
4 We construct an intertemporal version of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistically
competitive framework of the type applied by Helpman-Krugman (1989) in the international
context. International transmission of disturbances in the presence of monopolistic competition
and nominal rigidities has been dealt with by Dornbusch (1987), Aizenman (1989) and
Svenssou and van Wijnbergen (1989).
5 Related models that focused on the entry-exit decisions facing entrepreneurs in the
presence of volatile exchange rates are Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989).-4-
the presence of positive productivity shock more than it does under a flexible rate. The
employment expansion in the presence of a positive productivity shock under a fixed exchange
rate works towards increasing expected profits, raising thereby the productive capacity,
domestic investment, and FDL6 We also demonstrate that under a flexible exchange rate
regime more volatile real shocks will increase investment and international trade, whereas a
higher volatility of nominal shocks will reduce investment and trade. These results suggest
that the sign of the correlations among exchange rate volatility, investment, and trade are
determined by the mixture of the shocks affecting the economy.
In section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium, and Section
4 derives the closed-form solution for a simple example. Section 5comparesthe various
possible regimes, and Section 6 closes the discussion.
2.The Model
We consider a minimal model capable of addressing the above issues: a two-country, a
two-period, and a two-classes.of-goods model. In the first period entrepreneurs face the
investment decisions, determining the productive capacity of the economy in the second period.
We start in period one, with a given endowment of good Y, denoted by Y. Good Y serves as
both the consumption and the investment good in the first period. An entrepreneur may invest
in one of the two countries (operating as a nondiversified producer), or in both countries
(operating as a multinational). Following the capacity decisions of the first period,
entrepreneurs will use the services of labor in the second period towards the production of
differentiated products, denoted by D and indexed by i. We start by presenting the key
6It is noteworthy that our analysis does not imply that a fixed exchange rate regime
is superior to a flexible exchange rate system: one should compare the behavior of employment
across regimes, in addition to a comparison of expected consumption. In a different context
we have shown that this type of a model implies that the literature of the eighties overstated the
case for a flexible exchange rate regime (see Aizenman (1991)).-5-
behavioralassumptions of the model, describing the preferences, production, the nature of the
uncertainty, and the money market.
2.1Preferences
The utility of the representative agent is given by
(I)=1D2÷g(L)l+p
where L denotes labor, g' < 0, g" <0 and Y1 is the consumption of the homogeneous good at
period one. The subjective rate of time preference is reflected by p, and the disutility from
labor is captured by g(L). The utility derived from consuming d varieties of the differentiated
products is given by D2:
d 1/ct
(2) D2 = (D2,i)a
for 0 < a < i ; and p > 0. The term D2;j is the consumption level of variety i in period two.
Agents in the foreign country have .the same utility.
2.2Production
The production of the differentiated product in plants located in the home and the
foreign economy, respectively, is given by a Cobb-Douglas function:
(3) =
.k(L)Y;D = for<i< 1
In order to deal with macro issues we would like to model a short-run Phillips curve,-6-
where nominal disturbances are transmitted into the real economy in the short run. We adapt
here the Fischer-Gray formulation of labor contracts, where labor is employed subject to
nominal contracts. The wage for period two is preset at level \\,sothat the expected
employment equals the employment target, L. Within the second period, employment is
demand-determined: producers demand labor so as to maximize their profits,7 Henceforth,
foreign values are indexed by an asterisk.
2.3Investment. Uncertainty and the Producer's Problem
The investment is location- and product-specific, allowing the production of the
differentiated product i at the chosen location. An entrepreneur may invest in one of the two
countries, at a cost of K. Alternatively, entrepreneurs may diversify their productive capacity,
by investing both at home and in the foreign country at a cost of K(l÷'r), for i￿I. A
diversified producer operates as a multinational firm, having the capacity to produce his
variety in both countries. 8 Entrepreneurs are risk neutral, and there is free entry. The
uncertainty pertains to the future productivity of labor and the supply of money in each
economy. The joint distribution of the shocks is symmetric, and is kno.vn to all agents in
period one. Investment is implemented at period one, prior to the resolution of the uncertainty
7See Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977). For applications of the. Fischer-Gray
framework in an open economy see, for example, Flood and Marion (1982), Turnovsky
(1983) and Marston and Turnovsky (1985). It is noteworthy that there are alternative ways of
modeling the short-run Phillips curve. For example, one can apply Lucass framework of
incomplete contemporaneous information regarding the decomposition of the aggregate shock
into the real and the nominal parts. The key results of our approach can be delivered in such
an alternative framework.
8The value of I -i measuresthe returns to scale, associated with the presence of
fixed costs that may be shared by both locations.-7-
regarding the productivity in period two. A strategy of diversifying the investment can be
viewed as "buying" the option of channeling production to the more productive location.
More formally, let us denote the real gross profits (revenue minus the wage bill) of a
diversified and a specialized producer by d and and, respectively. A nondiversified
equilibrium, where all producers specialize in one location, can be characterized by
(4a)E{itnd] K(l +p)
(4b)E{itd]<K(1 +p)(l +ii)
where E stands for the expectation operator, referring to the first-period expected level of
second-period profits. Equation (4a) is generated by the free entry, implying the break-even
condition. Condition (4b) implies that the marginal producer does not have an incentive to
diversify internationally. Integrating the two conditions we infer that a nondiversified
equilibrium is stable if
(5)E[7td]Efitfld]<Ti
Equation(5)indicatesthat the (percentage) gain from diversification falls short of the





9The intermediate case, where producers will be indifferent between the two
investment strategies, will occur if all the inequalities in (5)and(6) are replaced with-8-
E,td] - ,tnd] ()
E[itnd)
2.4 The MoneyMarket:
Tosimplify exposition, we adapt the simplest specification of thedemand formoney: a
constant velocity specification where the demand for money equals a fraction q of the nominal
domestic GNP, and for notation simplicity we assume q =I.Under a fixed exchange rate
regime, the national money markets are integrated into a unified international money market.
The equilibrium is characterized by the equality of the global demand and supply of money,
where the balance of payment mechanism generates the desirable distribution of money across
countries. Under a flexible exchange rate system the money market is national, and domestic
prices and the exchange rate are determined so as to equate the demand and the supply of
money at each country.
3. The Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be analyzed by first characterizing the consumer's and producer's
behaviors, and then by describing the possible regimes.
3.1Consumer's Demand







where P2;j ,IN2 are the second-period money pricesof good i and the second-period






(10) P2 = (P2,i)"T
The overall price index of differentiated products is P2. The consumer's utility function (1)
is additive in the consumption of the homogeneous good in period one and the consumption of
the differentiated products aggregate D2. Applying (9) and (10) it follows that=
IN2 IP2.This implies that if we observe an internal equilibrium where goods are consumed
in both periods, the real interestrate in terms of good Y must equal 1 +p.At that interest
rate, consumers are willing to postpone consumption to the second period, and the aggregate
saving is determined by the investment. Henceforth we assume that the supply of the
homogeneous good is large enough to induce an internal equilibrium.10
10Note that the assumption of risk-neutral entrepreneurs implies that investment Tin
period one, generating nominal income fl2 in the second period, will be undertaken if
E[ 2 / P2] -1(1+p)￿ 0. It can be shown that if the supply of Y is small enough, the
Cobb-Douglas production function (defined by (3)) implies a corner solution where all Y is
invested, and none is consumed in the first period. In such a case, the real interest rate is- 10-
3.2Producer's Pricing
The producer of a differentiated product i has market power, facing a demand, the
elasticity of which is a (see (9)). The condition for maximizing profits is that the value of the
marginal product of labor (given by the product of the marginal revenue and the marginal
product of labor) equals the wage. Applying (3) and (9) we can infer that the resultant supply
of the differentiated product and the demand for labor (denoted by D.1 and
respectively) are
(11) D .= a1/(1-T)cry '2,i; L .=cry 2,i"
W0 " aWçj
where y' =
1 .Theproducers' nominal profits (denoted by fl21 )are
(12)112,i =(1-ay)P2,lD2,.
We turn now to characterize the equilibrium in a fixed and a flexible exchange rate
regime. The two countries are identical ex ante, hence we focus on the symmetric equilibrium.
3.3Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
We normalize the exchange rate to unity, and assume away transportation costs and
commercial policy. Thus, the price of the same variety is the same in both countries. We
contrast first the case where all producers are nondiversified, specializing in one country,
determined by the marginal productivity of capital. If the supply of Y is large enough to
ensure positive consumption in period one, the real interest rate is determined by preferences
(=l+p). Insuch a case, the actual investment is determined by the demand for investment at
that real interest rate.— 11—
versusthe case where all producers operate as multinationals. Having accomplished this, we
may characterize the edge knife cases of a mixed regime, where both multinationals and
specialized producers operate, as borderline combinations of the above cases.
3.3.1 Nondiversified Producers
If all producers operate as nondiversified in a symmetric equilibrium, m producers
specialize in the production of distinct varieties in each country, and the total number of goods








a 1N2-i- IN,j = i,...,m.
WO P2,j P2
(13)
b. P2 =(m)1P2;r)+( P2,r*) -
1f(aa)
S * *




f. (I -czy) 2,i=K(1÷p)
L P2
Condition (13a) is the goods market equilibrium, equating the supply to the sum of the
domestic and the foreign demand (as inferred from (9) and (11)). A similar condition applies- 12-
forforeign varieties. Equation (13b) is the consumer CPI index, obtained from (10), where r
and r* stand for a representative variety produced at home and abroad. The nominal income
equals the nominal GNP, as given by (13c). Recalling that we assumed a unitary velocity, the
equilibrium in the global money market is stated in (I 3d), where index s stands for the supply.
Applying the Fischer-Gray macro framework, the wage contract is set according to (13e), to
equate the expected employment to the employment target. Free entry implies that net rents
arc zero, as is postulated by (131).
3.3.2 Multinational Producers:
Applying similar considerations, if all producers are multinational, and there are n of
them, the equilibrium will be characterized by
a.(a)- 1/(I-)cry P2+ (a) a'l' P2,i
Y 1N2÷ 1N




C IN2 =fl2,r t4r;1N =flP2,r D.r
d. IN2 +1N=M÷ M*
e. n EL,j] =L
I P2{D.÷D;s} f. E(1-cry)
'.2'" =K(l+ri)(1-+-p)
L P2
Multinational producers will produce in both countries; thus the supply of each good is the sum- 13-
ofthe production in plants located in both countries (as indicated by (14a)). The CPI is
modified in accordance with the presence of goods produced simultaneously in both countries.
The zero expected rents condition (141) recognizes that profits are due to production in both
locations, and that the cost of capital goes up (at a rate of Ti) due to the needed investment in
two plants. In addition to the conditions postulated in (13) and (14), stability conditions
determine the nature of the regime. We observe a nationalistic equilibrium where all
producers specialize in one location, if the marginal benefit from becoming multinational falls
short of the extra capacity cost, and thus a version of (5)shouldbe satisfied. Similarly, we
will observe a multinational equilibrium if producers will not benefit by switching to a
nationalistic strategy, and thus a version of (7) applies. We turn now to characterize the
equilibrium in a flexible exchange rate regime.
3.4Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
With a flexible exchange rate the money market clears in each country separately,
determining the price levels in the two economies and indirectly the exchange rate. We denote
the exchange rate by S, defined as the domestic currency price of a unit of foreign currency.
The law of one price is assumed to hold for the same variety, and thus P2 S ,where
2,i stands for the foreign currency price of variety i abroad. The modified equilibrium
conditions are- 14-
3.4.1Nondiversified Producers
a.(a)-1/(1'P2,j\1= lJzYIN2 +S1N =
w0 Jp2j)
I •
- I/(l..()(ay P2,J) =I P2 \ IN2 + S 1N j = I,..., in t P2
aci- 1/(a c)
b.2 =(m)1/(ac(P2;r)a+(S P;r*)
C.INm 2,r IN; =mP,r* D*r* (15)
d. IN2 =MIN =Mc
e. m E1L,i1 =L
I
P2,jD1= K(1+p) f.(1 -ay)2 i
3.4.2 Multinational Producers
An equilibrium under a flexible exchange rate regime, where all producers are
multinational, is characterized by




C IN2=" 12,rDr;S IN; =' P2,rD*r- 15-
*
A 4S YXT
U. IkN =WI2 11N—
1V12
e. nEfL1]=L
I P2i(D+D;} f. (1 -ay)' =K(l +ii)(1 +p)
L P2
We now characterize the equilibrium for a simple example.
4.Real and Nominal Shocks. Volatility, and Investment
Further insight is gained by focusing on the simplest stochastic example: two states of
nature, with a negative correlation between the domestic and foreign shocks.'' Exposition is
simplified further by considering the extreme cases, where all shocks are either real or
nominal. When we understand these two extreme cases, we can redo the analysis for the
general case.
4.1Real Shocks:




(1-h, l+h) ,withequal probabilities (1 >h>0).
11The simplicity of the example enables us to focus on a closed-form solution,
discarding the need to use first-order approximations. While being a special example, it
allows us to describe the economic forces at work. Our results can be shown to apply to richer
stochastic environments, with any number of states of nature. Our analysis can be readily
extended to the case of a positive correlation.- 16 -
4.1.1Fixed Exchange Rate Regime. Real Shocks:
Solvingthe systems summarizedin (13) and (14) we infer that investment in the




+ hr'' - tfl- h)°
-
(18)
=(1 -ay)(2L)(1+ h)'' + (i -h)''.)lY a(1+y)-l_____
,R 1+p K(1+-rl)
where 1FI,R stands for fixed exchange rate, subject to real shocks. The condition determining
the nature of the regime is obtained by applying (5), yielding the result that producers will
operate as nondiversified if h is small enough that'2
(19) [(i +h)11 -h)1' <(I + ).5[(i+h''+ (i -h)'.a))]
anddiversification will occur if the opposite inequality holds. There are two possible reasons
for diversification: returns to scale, and the gains originating from the option of reallocating
production towards the more productive country. Internationally diversified capacity will




Thevalue of E[] is obtained by
calculating the profits that will occur to a marginal producer that will switch to a multinational
strategy. This is found by using a version of (14a) for the case where all other producers
behave as specified in (13).- 17-
marginalproductivity at a cost of increasing the capital expenditure by factor q. If this cost is
small enough, it will be worthwhile to invest in multiple plants. Formally, we obtain from
(18) that if2a -l>T, then producers will diversify independently of volatility.
If this condition is not satisfied, international diversification will occur if volatility (as
measured by h) is high enough. A higher volatility increases the economic value of the
diversification, by increasing the value of the option to reallocate production towards the more
productive or the cheaper country. Diversification will occur if the value of this option
exceeds the extra cost of capital, as will occur if the inequality in (19) is reversed. Inspection
of (19) shows that as long as 1 > r, for large enough h producers will diversify internationally.
Henceforth, we will assume that 2a'cr')-1 <T < 1 .Hence,in the absence of
uncertainty producers will specialize.
4.1.2 Flexible Exchange Rate Regime. Real Shocks:
Solving the systems summarized in (15) and (16) we infer that investment in the
nondiversified and the multinational regimes is given by
1-aT
a. mKi





b. .5nK(l+11)IFL R =
2(1 -ay)(L)Ta(I+1).1 1
l+p K(1+1)
where index FL,R stands for a flexible exchange rate, in the presence of real shocks.
Applying (5) we infer that producers will operate as nondiversified if and only if h is small
enough, in such a way that
cz(1-)
(21)[(i + h$W(' Y) + (1 -h$'Y)'(' <(1+ i1).5 [(i + hr + (1 -hr]- 18-
anddiversification will occur if the opposite inequality holds. Similarly to the case of the
fixed exchange rate, the condition for observing a nondiversified regime in the absence of
cx(l-'y)/(l—ay) volatility is that 2 -1 <TI
Wewill henceforth assume that the various heterogeneous goods are close substitutes,
and that the labor share is large enough that 1/(1 +y)<a.Thisassumption is needed in
order to insure that a higher set-up cost K will reduce the number of varieties offered.1 3
Applying (18), (20) it can be shown that
mKIFLR <mKi1
(22) .5n(1 +n)KIFLR<(1 +TDKIFIR
and that the switch from nondiversified to a multinational investment strategy occurs in a fixed
exchange rate regime at a lower volatility than in a flexible exchange rate system.
4.2 Monetary Shocks
We turn now to evaluate the adjustment to a monetary disturbance. Suppose that the
supply of money is given by
(MO(1-i-h) ,Mj(l-h)}
(17) (M,M*) =( or
(M(1-h) ,MO(l+h)) ,withequal probabi1ities
where M and M* stand for nominal balances in the two countries.
13It can be shown that the elasticity of expected real profits with respect to the
number of varieties is [1 -a(l+y)]/a.Ifthe demand for the various varieties is relatively
inelastic, more varieties will reduce the labor employed in the production of a representative
variety, raising thereby profits. This will have the consequence that profits will go up with the
number of varieties, and that a higher setup cost will imply more producers. The assumption
that the varieties are close substitutes rules out this outcome.- 19 -
4.2.1Fixed ExchangeRate Regime. Nominal Shocks:
Solvingthe systems summarized in (13) and (14), we infer that investment in the
nondiversified and the multinational regimes is given by
[.5(1- a.y)(2L)1







where 1F1,M stands for fixed exchange rate, subject to monetary shocks. The condition
determining the nature of the regime is obtained by applying (5),yieldingthat producers will
cL(1—'l(1—cry)
operateas nondiversified if and only if 2 -1 <i.
4.2.2 Flexible Exchange Rate Regime. Nominal shocks:
Solving the systems summarized in (15) and (16), we infer that investment in the












- cry)(L)(1+ hjt' + (i -h))1cz(I+y)-I[ 1]
1÷p j LK(1+i)j
where index 1FL,M stands for a flexible exchange rate regime, in the presence of monetary
shocks. Applying (5)weinfer that producers will operate as nondiversified if and only if h is





- <(I+i1).5 [(I + h)+(i-hrl
and diversification will occur if the opposite inequality holds. Similarly to the case of the
fixed exchange rate, the condition for observing a nondiversified producer is that the
a(l—y)I(l—a-y)
internationalreturn to scale is not powerful, so that 2 -l <i
Comparing(23) and (25) we infer that
mKIM <tFI,M
(26) .5 a (1 +11)KIFLM <.5n (1 +ii)KIFJM
We turn now to evaluate the patterns of investment.
5.Comparison Among Regimes
We turn now to a graphic summary of the results, and an economic interpretation of the
findings. The comparison among regimes is done by tracing the dependency of aggregate
investment on the volatility of shocks. The aggregate investment for each country is given by
mK +. 5nK(l +Ti),whereas the volatility measure is h. The assumption of risk-neutral
entrepreneurs, and the fact that gross profits are a fraction 1 -ay of revenue imply that the
expected utility from consumption is given by14
14 We obtain this result in several steps. First, we note that the first period budget
constraint is=Y-mK-.5nK(1 +ri).From (9) and (10) we infer that that=
IN2 'P2,where IN2 is the nominal GNP. Equation (27) is inferred by applying this result21 -
(27)EfY, +1)2
]= + a'[mK +.5nK(l+11))
Ll÷p 1-ay
Consequently,tracing the behavior of aggregate investment gives us information regatding the
expected utility of consumption, or equivalently the expected net present value of real
consumption.'5 In our model trade accounts (on average) for half of the GNP, and thus
tracing the expected consumption provides us also with information regarding the average
volume of international trade.
Figures 2a and 2b summarize the dependency of the productive capacity on the volatility
of shocks for real and nominal disturbances, respectively. Curves denoted by F!, FL
correspond to fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, and N and D correspond to
nondiversified and diversified regimes, respectively. The figures reveal that for a given
volatility of the shocks, a fixed exchange rate regime is associated with higher domestic
investment and FDI, relative to a flexible exchange rate. While the figures are drawn for the
special example considered here, its underlying logic is more general. With free entry, the
behavior of aggregate investment traces the behavior of gross profit, which on average is the
return to capital. For a given volatility of shocks, a fixed exchange rate regime is associated
with higher expected profits. If the shocks are monetary, then employment will fluctuate more
under a flexible exchange rate regime. In fact, in our example employment will be stable
under a fixed exchange rate. The volatility of employment and production under a floating
exchange rate will depress expected profits. This argument is traced in Figure 3, where the
s;O production function in the absence of real shocks is given by D .TheImpact of volatility
and (13f), (14f), (150, (160, calculating the expected utility of consumption.
15Note that (27) represents only the consumption component of the expected utility.







Investment and Nominal Shocks
FL = flexible exchange rate; Fl = fixed exchange rate;





Investment and Real Shocks- 22 -
due to monetaryshocks in a flexible exchange rate system is that employment will fluctuate
between L1 andLh(where Lh -L=L-L1).This will depress expected profits, from
point K2 to point K3.
The case of real shocks is more involved, because the production function shifts around
the non- stochastic production, fluctuating between and D'1 in the state of high and low
productivity, respectively. If we operate in the regimes where all producers diversify, in a
fixed exchange rate regime we will observe reallocation of employment from the less
productive towards the more productive country. This reallocation is smaller in a flexible
exchange rate regime because the country experiencing the more favorable realization of
productivity will experience nominal and real appreciation, which will mitigate (and
potentially eliminate) the resultant expansion of employment. In fact, in our case a flexible
exchange rate eliminates the volatility of employment. The greater reallocation of employment
towards the more efficient country in a fixed exchange rate regime will tend to increase
expected profits, thereby encouraging investment. In terms of Figure 3, employment will
fluctuate between L1 and L11 in a fixed exchange rate regime, and will stay at L in a flexible
exchange rate regime. The reallocation of employment observed in a fixed exchange rate
regime increases expected output. To see this, note that the marginal product of labor at point
A exceeds that at point B by a factor of 2h. Thus, starting with employment level L in both
countries under a fixed exchange rate regime, a marginal reduction of employment in the less
productive country and a corresponding increase in employment in the more productive
country will increase expected profits by the discrepancies of the marginal product. The same
logic applies to the consecutive reallocation of employment across countries, until we eliminate
this arbitrage opportunity (i.e, until we reach a point like A' and B where the marginal
product is equal in the two countries). In terms of Figure 3, this will result with expected














exchangerate regime, K2. 16 17
Figure 2 reveals that the correlation between investment and exchange rate volatility
under a flexible exchange rate depends on the nature of shocks. Higher volatility of shocks is
associated with a higher volatility of the exchange rate. Note that curves are upward-sloping in
Figure 2a, downward-sloping in Figure 2b. Hence, if the dominant shocks are nominal, we will
observe a negative correlation, whereas if the dominant shocks are real, we will observe a
positive correlation between exchange rate volatility and the level of investment.
16Note that the producer cares about the expected real profits. In our monopolistic
competitive framework there is positive association between output and real profits, and hence
higher expected output implies also higher expected profits.
17While the above explanation was given in terms of a multinational producer, the
same logic applies for the case of nationalistic producers, where the reallocation of
employment should be viewed as reallocation that occurs across states of nature for a given
economy.- 24-
6.Concluding Remarks
Ratherthan repeating the summary provided in the first section, we close the paper with
concluding remarks. Our analysis suggests that nominal shocks in a flexible exchange rate
regime have adverse implications on investment behavior and that attempts to encourage FDI
may benefit by adapting a fixed exchange rate. While we focused on the case where nominal
shocks stem from the stochastic supply of money, the same analysis applies if the volatility
stems from the stochastic demand for money, or from "bubbles".18 These results suggest that
attempts to minimize nominal shocks by the proper coordination of monetary policies are
beneficial, and that these benefits may occur indirectly by encouraging investment. It is useful
to note that our results continues to hold even if producers have access to a forward exchange
rate market. The results derived in this paper stem from the absence of complete markets in
the presence of contracts that do not allow for complete contingent prices. The addition of
forward coverage does not solve the market incompleteness, and all the paper's results
continue to hold. Finally, it is noteworthy that we assumed risk neutrality, and thus none of
our results is related to risk-averse behavior. While we do not negate the potential importance
of risk aversion, we view this as a useful benchmark that can be enriched to accommodate
more complicated behavior.
18See Frankel and Froot (1990) for a study that analyzed 'bubbles' as a potential
driving force in the evolution of exchange rates.- 25-
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